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Hadi Prabowo

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CORRUPTION IN LOCAL AUTONOMY
Hadi Prabowo\textsuperscript{1}

ABSTRACT

Regional autonomy gives space to the regions to manage and regulate their own regions that linier with the mandate of Law No. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government. This phenomenon shows that changes in the flow of resources that are more centralized in the Central Government are divided into regions. This condition is in line with the shifting of power in the regions. On the other hand, this shift could open up the potential for the occurrence of corruption which also tends to move to regions, where regions are considered a new strategic resource center. This research focuses on seeing corruption in the implementation of regional autonomy.

Local strongman theory, patron-client relations, corruption, and clientelism are used in answering the problem of corruption in regional autonomy. The method used in this study is qualitative in the form of literature studies supported by related documents through the media, statistical data, and other supporting data. The results of this study indicate that corruption in regional autonomy still occurs both at the lowest level of public services to regional heads. In addition, corruption often occurs in the form of clientelism and patron-client relations as evidenced by the rampant bribery cases involving regional heads. Furthermore, various guidance and supervision programs carried out by the Government are expected to reduce the effects of potential corruption.

Keywords: Corruption, Regional Autonomy

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A. INTRODUCTION

The term corruption or corruptio in Latin word corrupere which means rotten, damaged, destabilizing, twisting, bribing is the act of public officials, both politicians and civil servants, as well as other parties involved in those actions which are improperly and illegally abusing trust the public is authorized to them to get unilateral benefits. A term that coincides with the notion of collusion and nepotism, which in the modern paradigm means conspiracy to secure personal, group and mutual interests. Meanwhile, nepotism is a view and understanding that is oriented towards closeness in genetic perceptions or descent, race, ethnicity, language, religion or various other similarities that are associated with the interests of the existence of someone who is bound in the social system (Effendy, 2010). The series of collusion, corruption and nepotism activities can be carried out in a structured and systemic manner, also carried out partially and pragmatically according to the needs and events that are happening. All of that leads to state losses, especially in the form of material.

In the legal perspective shows that corruption is someone's act against the law to enrich themselves or others or a corporation that can harm the state. Corruption can also be explained generally in 13 articles in Law No. 31 of 1999 which has been amended by Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning Eradication of Corruption Crime. Based on these articles, corruption is formulated into 30 forms/types of corruption. The articles explain in detail the actions that can be subject to corruption sanctions that can be grouped as follows: 1) State financial losses, 2) Bribery, 3) Embrace in office, 4) Extortion, 5) Cheating, 6) Conflict of interest in procurement, and 7) Gratuity.

The locus from the point of vulnerability to corruption in the area is the aspect of planning and procurement of goods and services. In the context of planning, planning is often wrong and has the potential for abuse of authority for the benefit of various parties. Whereas the procurement of goods and services is a central point for the economic activities of the community, including businessmen in maintaining their business and capital. On
the other hand, guidance and supervision as a function of government control still play a partial role, including efforts to carry out unsustainable evaluations. Evaluation efforts to conduct internal or inter-agency negotiations are still experiencing various obstacles, especially the provision of human resources and the essence of aspects of authority in law.

Based on the results of evaluating the implementation of regional government, regional performance is considered to be less than optimal in managing finances. This was compounded by the many regional heads and deputy regional heads who were caught in legal cases. Referring to the data compiled by the Directorate General of Regional Autonomy of the Ministry of Home Affairs, during the period of 2015-2018 regional heads and deputy regional heads who were entangled in legal cases there were as many as 80 cases, of which 69 cases were cases of corruption, bribery and gratification. Of the 69 cases, 30 of them were Hand-Catching Operations (OTT) by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), where for the year 2018 there were 19 Regional Heads who were OTT by the KPK. This certainly reinforces the assumption that regional autonomy creates small kings in the region.

This condition shows that the culture of corruption in Indonesia is still alive and continues to grow. Cases of corruption occur because of several factors including:

a. There is a reciprocal relationship, there is the potential for negotiations between candidates for regional heads and persons with interests in the area, both political, governmental, social and economic interests.

b. The occurrence of a monopoly of power that regional heads have enormous power in managing the APBD budget, recruitment of regional officials, licensing natural resources, procurement of goods and services and making regional head regulations, and the existence of power dynasties, this causes regional heads to commit corruption through bribery and gratuity.

c. Policy discretion, discretion is done because not all are covered by
regulations so that a policy is needed to decide something, so that what is targeted can be fulfilled without having to wait for the available rules. Often the discretion carried out by the regional head is against the regulations which creates potential and suspicion of corruption.

d. Weak transparency and accountability in budget management, asset management, procurement of goods and services, use of the Regional Budget. Furthermore, according to the report of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) for the first semester period of 2018, the quality of regional financial management is inadequate. From the results of the 2017 Regional Government Financial Report (LKPDB) examination by the BPK, out of 542 Regional Governments in Indonesia, only 411 (76%) received Unqualified Opinion (WTP), and there were still 113 (21%) of fair opinion With Exceptions (WDP), as well as 18 (3%) regions with opinions not expressing opinion (TMP).

Some of these factors indicate that the conditions and behavior of corruption in the regions tend not to experience many changes, even tend to increase. Corruption in regional autonomy is the focus of research studies based on empirical conditions to find new ideas that are expected to reduce various acts of corruption.

B. CORRUPTION IN THE EMPIRICAL, YURIDICIAL, AND THEORETICAL ASPECTS.

Empirical Aspect

1. Corruption in the view of Arief Rachman Hakim, handling cases of criminal acts of corruption at the appeal level does not run optimally. The obstacle is because the case handling process does not work in accordance with the design, both in the court administration process and in the examination process by the panel of judges as the spearhead of the justice giver. Problems, namely: how is the practice of conducting
and examining cases of criminal acts of corruption on appeal? Is the decision of the appellate judge only through examination of case files, can substantial justice be realized? This study uses a normative juridical approach and empirical jurisdiction. Resource persons consisted of high court clerks, judges of corruption, and prosecutors. Data collection is done by literature study and field studies. Data analysis is done qualitatively.

Based on the results of the research and discussion it was concluded, that the practice of handling cases of corruption is at the appeal level through several processes. First, the court administration process, running or not examining cases is very dependent on the court administration. If the administration of the court does not go well, it will also have an impact on the performance of judges in handling cases. Second, examinations by the panel of judges in examining cases are only based on case files received from the district court, and carried out alternately between the panel of judges before musawarah is conducted to determine the verdict to be dropped.

Judges' decisions only through examining case files can obscure the true value of justice, because not always the case files explain clearly the revealed legal facts and the reason for the appeal filing an appeal. Suggestions in this study are that the Supreme Court's supervision of officials in the Tanjung Karang High Court should be improved, so that court officials work according to established rules, because whether or not law enforcement is running depends on the subsystem in the court, namely the court administration and judges as a giver of justice.

The existence of Corruption Crime Judges (TIPIKOR) should emphasize the performance as a justice provider, not an executor of the Law. So that in examining cases
it is not confined to a long-running habit in the court that obscures the value of justice in its decisions.

2. According to Ernny Apriyanti Salakay about the Existence of the Corruption Eradication Commission as a State Auxiliary Body in the State Administration System in Indonesia. It has a purpose to find out the consequences of the position of the Corruption Eradication Commission as a state auxiliary body in the constitutional system in Indonesia and to find out the obstacles faced by the Corruption Eradication Commission and efforts to overcome these obstacles. This research is a normative study with a legal political approach.

The results of this study indicate that the consequences of the Corruption Eradication Commission as a state auxiliary body in the constitutional system in Indonesia are independence and the existence of the Corruption Eradication Commission depends on state law politics. Independence is meant in the institutional sense and in carrying out the main duties and functions of the Corruption Eradication Commission in eradicating corruption.

The obstacles faced by the Corruption Eradication Commission related to its existence are institutional limitations, human resources, budgeting, limited political support, and legal culture. Efforts can be made to overcome these obstacles, namely to build synergy between law enforcement agencies, legal protection for the Corruption Eradication Commission apparatus, and state support for the Corruption Eradication Commission.

3. According to Dr. Chrisma Suhaendi & Zanuddin in an effort to identify the effectiveness and efficiency of implementing good governance based on information technology (e-Governance) in the Central Java provincial government. This is intended so that corruption carried out by government officials can be prevented / avoided. To achieve this
goal it is necessary to identify existing conditions and constraints
that arise from both internal and external factors that can hinder the
implementation of this system.

The population in this study was all regional work units (SKPD)
in the Central Java Provincial Government with the unit of analysis
of the SKPD Head. Samples were taken using proportional random
sampling. The results of the discussion on the study of corruption
and e-governance concluded that the types of state arrest, influence and
administrative corruption could occur anytime and anywhere. However, the
biggest concern of corruption by government officials is administrative
corruption. To prevent corruption from local governments, it must
apply the use of e-governance or the application of information technology
to support the implementation of good governance systems. However,
the most important thing is the commitment of all officials in the
local government.

4. According to Bambang Suprayitno
Both on the concept and empirical
side, at the global level it shows the
condition of the absence of certainty
from the influence of fiscal
decentralization on the level of
corruption. So the conclusions taken
from the existing empirical side are
contextual. For this reason, research
is needed for the Indonesian context.
This research is intended to prove the
effect of fiscal decentralization on
corruption at the regional (provincial)
level in Indonesia and to see the
influence of various other factors on
corruption. The data used are
secondary data in the form of cross
section data from corruption cases
that were dropped in the Supreme
Court appeal for the 2001-2009
average, where the unit of analysis
for this study was at the provincial
level. Whereas to be used as the
independent variable, various data are
used from various institutions such as
Balancing Funds, per capita GRDP,
Literacy Rate, Employee
Expenditure, and Population
Population. The approach used is quantitative econometrics with the Tobit model. The results of this study indicate that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on corruption, meaning that the higher the level of fiscal decentralization in the region increases corruption in the region concerned. The population also has a positive effect on corruption. In addition, increasing the detection rate of the surrounding area can reduce corruption in the area. The level of employee salaries, per capita GRDP and literacy and puppet variables of special autonomy have not been shown to affect the magnitude of corruption. On average, rich regions have lower levels of corruption than poor regions. Regions outside Java-Bali (non-DKI-West Java-Banten) have an average corruption lower than corruption in Java-Bali. Whereas provinces in the center of government and economies such as DKI - West Java - Banten have higher corruption than other regions.

5. According to Ridwan Corruption is a crime that has extraordinary effects. The highest number of cases is the worst threat to people's welfare because of state financial losses which means that welfare will be difficult to achieve. Thus, it is necessary to get public participation in preventing crime. Despite the fact that these efforts will not succeed in eradicating corruption in Indonesia because it is considered a white-collar crime. However, this is important because this is a kind of social control. The higher the participation of the community, the smaller the crime. Such efforts are part of the responsibility of the government, in concrete terms by realizing Government Regulation Number 71, 2000 concerning the Code of Ethics for the Participation of People in Running Government by giving awards to those who enforce crime.

Yuridical Aspect

1. Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 concerning
Eradication of Corruption Crimes

Any person who illegally commits an act enriching himself or another person or a corporation that can harm state finance or the country's economy, be sentenced to prison with life imprisonment or criminal imprisonment of a minimum of 4 (four) years and a maximum of 20 (twenty) years and a fine of at least Rp200,000,000.00 (two hundred million rupiahs) and at most Rp1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiahs).

2. According to the Legal Perspective, the definition of corruption is clearly explained in 13 articles in Law No. 31 of 1999 which has been amended by Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning Eradication of Corruption Crime. Based on these articles, corruption is formulated into 30 forms/types of corruption. The article explains in detail about actions that can be subject to criminal sanctions for corruption. The 30 forms/types of corruption can basically be grouped as follows:

State financial losses, bribes, embezzlement in positions, extortion, fraudulent acts, conflicts of interest in procurement, gratification.

Theoretical Aspect

1. An act of crime occurs if there are two factors which are the first factor of intention and the second is the opportunity, if there is no intention and opportunity does not exist, if there is an intention but there is an opportunity there is also an opportunity but no intention. This phenomenon does not occur a crime activity.

2. Local Strongmen are characters who are synonymous with the strengths they have and have expertise in their field, local strongmen is a term that is identical to the elite, although there are many understandings of the concept of the elite. But basically there is a common understanding that the concept of elite refers to a group of people as superior individuals who are
different from the masses who control networks of power or groups that are in the circle of power and are in power as well as with local strongmen. The superiority of the elite over the masses depends entirely on their success in manipulating their environment with symbols, virtues, or actions.

3. Clientelism is defined as a transaction between politicians and citizens where there is material compensation for political support in elections (Wamchekom, 2003). Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) define clientelism as a personal form, exchange that is dyadic and based on feelings of obligation and the imbalance of power among those involved. Whereas James Scott in Muno (2010) defines clientelism as a mechanism of friendship where individuals with high socioeconomic status (patron) use their influence and resources by providing protection or benefits or both to people who are of lower status (clients) who as part of the patron provide support and services to patrons.

4. James Scott has the view that the patron client relationship is the exchange of relations between the two roles which can be expressed as a special case of bending which involves instrumental friendship where an individual with a higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his influence and resources to provide protection and benefits for someone with a lower status (client). The client then responds by offering general support and assistance including personal services to his patron.

C. METHODOLOGY

This research uses qualitative methods and document studies based on corruption cases in Indonesia. The document is in the form of information on the results of decisions, litigation, evidence, evidence and involvement of suspects.

Bogdan and Taylor, (1993: 30) argue that the qualitative approach method is a
research procedure that produces data based on; people's expressions or notes as well as the behavior of the object of research included in the observation. The approach in this method leads to situations and individuals holistically. In line with this, Denzin and Lincoln in Creswell, (2013: 5) have the view that qualitative research is research using natural settings, with the intention of interpreting or understanding phenomena that occur and are carried out by involving various existing methods.

D. DISCUSSION

One of the impacts of regional autonomy is that the circulation of money and goods will occur more in the regions than at the center. Through regional autonomy it is hoped that the regions will be able to become an aggregation of resources which are expected to be able to become a development stimulus. Development is expected to no longer be top-down but also bottom-up. This role makes the region a strategic and attractive place for negotiating interests from various groups, both politically to gain power and economic context to strengthen capital capital.

The attractiveness of the area is then in line with the provision of local wisdom space which on the one hand becomes the main foundation or pattern in regional-based development. On the other hand, the space for local wisdom becomes an opportunity for stakeholders to use it as capital in gaining power. This wisdom capital makes the community with a strong base of social capital and local wisdom able to dominate the Government. This segment of society can be known as local strongmen, where the superiority of the community layer, especially in the context of local wisdom, becomes a way to gain power.

The local strongmen context is not only associated with superiority in the context of social capital and local wisdom. Economic capital can also be a major source of obtaining power, especially needed in conducting open campaigns to the use of print and electronic media as a self-branding method. One of them can be seen
from the number of entrepreneurs who enter the political path to fight for power.

On the other hand, this condition actually formed a space for political negotiations between the elite owners of social capital, and the elite who owned economic capital. This has an impact on the formation of client patron spaces, where political support in the form of campaign capital is given in return for being elected to guarantee the elite capital. The patron-client condition is also closely related to clientelism as an articulation of negotiations between the social and economic elite, but also between the economic or social elite and other candidates. The economic elite can provide capital funds to prospective regional heads, while the social elite can provide the masses to these candidates.

Based on data from the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2016-2018 shows that the culture and trends of corruption are actually increasing, which can be seen as follows:

1. Value of index perception corruption (CPI) which for 2 (two) consecutive years stagnated at 37. In 2017, our country experienced a downgrade to rank 96 from previously ranked 90 out of 180 countries.

2. As many as 61% of public perceptions assess corruption is increasing, according to the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer survey. Things that are not much different from the LSI survey in 2018 which revealed a public perception of 57% assessing corruption and 67% of the public judging the government not seriously fighting corruption.

3. The Anti Corruption Behavior Index (IPAK) in 2018 has decreased to 3.66 which was originally 3.71. This indicates corruption in the public service sector is still happening.

4. In terms of numbers, from 2004 to 2018 there were 105 Regional Heads involved in corruption in the KPK, namely 19 Governors / Deputy Governors and 85 Regents / Mayors or their representatives.
While overall in 2017 there are at least 495 ASNs, 102 village heads, 37 DRPD members and 30 regional heads who are involved in corruption;

5. If viewed in terms of the mode of occurrence of corruption, there are 3 (three) areas of the greatest corruption, namely: (1) bribery in bribes totaling 466 cases; (2) Procurement of goods and services 180 cases; and (3) 46 cases of misuse of the budget;

6. A total of 2,357 civil servants who have been sentenced to criminal offenses and have been incarcerated, but have not been dismissed without respect.

The large potential for corruption in regional autonomy has become the focus of Government’s attention in reducing the trend and culture. In the 2016-2017 period, efforts by the Ministry of Home Affairs together with the KPK were involved in the implementation of Corruption Prevention Coordination and Supervision activities (KORSUPGAH), focusing on 9 intervention areas, namely:

1. APBD Planning and Budgeting;
2. Procurement of goods and services;
3. One-Stop Integrated Services;
4. APIP capability;
5. ASN Management;
6. Village Funds;
7. Optimization of Regional Revenues;
8. Asset Management;
9. Strategic program.

Furthermore, on July 20, 2018, the President issued Presidential Regulation Number 54 of 2018 concerning the National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption, which replaced Presidential Regulation No. 55 of 2012 concerning the National Strategy for the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption (STRANAS PPK) Long-Term for 2012-2025 and the Medium-Term 2012-2014. The regulation is intended to synergize various agendas and strategic steps within the framework of corruption prevention to be more oriented to benefits and impacts.

In order to achieve the expected benefits and impacts, through Presidential Regulation No. 54 in 2018 a National Corruption Prevention Team (TIMNAS PPK) was formed consisting of the Minister
of National Planning and Development, Minister of Empowerment of State Civil Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform, Minister of Home Affairs, Chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission and Presidential Chief of Staff. In its implementation, the PK National Team was assisted by the National Secretariat for the Prevention of Corruption which was based in the Corruption Eradication Commission.

The focus of STRANAS PK includes: a) licensing and trading procedures, b) State finance, c) law enforcement and bureaucratic reform. The focus is elaborated through the Action of Prevention of Corruption (AKSI PK) determined by the National Team of PK every 2 (two) years. The PK Year 2019-2020 Action consists of 11 actions, which include:

1) Improving services and compliance with licensing and investment;
2) Improving data governance and compliance with extractive, forestry and plantation sectors;
3) Utilization of population numbers to improve governance of the provision of social assistance and subsidies
4) Integration and synchronization of strategic food import data;
5) Application of anti-bribery management in the government and the private sector;
6) Integration of electronic-based planning and budgeting systems;
7) Increasing the professionalism and modernization of the procurement of goods and services;
8) Optimization of state revenues from tax and non-tax revenues;
9) Strengthening the implementation of bureaucratic reforms;
10) Implementation of the grand design of village financial supervision strategies; and
11) Improved governance of the integrated criminal justice system.

For Local Governments, Prevention Team Action 2019 - 2020 is focused on, a) improving services and compliance with licensing and investment; b) integration of electronic-based planning and budgeting systems; c) professionalism and modernization of the procurement of goods
and services; d) strengthening the implementation of bureaucratic reform.

Furthermore, to provide understanding and commitment to the implementation of the National Strategy for PK, the 2019-2020 PK Action and to set targets to be achieved, a meeting with the Regional Government is needed.

The next strategic achievement is the revitalization of relations between the Ministry of Home Affairs Inspectorate General and the Regional Inspectorate. Previous relationships that seemed distant, mutual distrust, and blamed each other between the center and the region, have been successfully revitalized in a community association called the Regional Inspector Forum throughout Indonesia through the inauguration of the Minister of Home Affairs in December 2017.

The Ministry of Home Affairs Inspectorate General has also been proactive in making joint efforts to prevent corruption along with KPK and other agencies. The efforts carried out in the 2016-2017 period were the involvement in the coordination of corruption prevention supervision (KORSUPGAH) activities with a focus on 9 areas, such as planning and budgeting, as well as regional opinion. In the 2018 period, the Joint Corruption Prevention effort was more concrete through the involvement of the Ministry of Home Affairs as the National Team for Prevention of Corruption in accordance with Presidential Regulation Number 54 of 2018 concerning National Strategy for Corruption.

Furthermore, the handling of corruption is also more focused on aspects of illegal levies which often occur in basic public services in Regional Governments. This is done through various things, including:

1. Regulation
   a. The Instruction of the Minister of Home Affairs has been compiled and published No. 180/3935 / SJ dated October 24, 2016 to Governors and Regents / Mayors concerning Supervision of Illegal Levies in the Implementation of Regional Government which includes increased guidance and
supervision of regional
governments on the area of risk
of illegal levies;

b. The Minister of Home Affairs
Circular Letter was issued and
issued. 700/4277 / SJ dated 11
November 2016 concerning
Establishment of the Provincial
and Regency / City Corruption
Eradication Task Force Unit;

c. Circular Letter No. 977/5065 / 
SJ dated 30 December 2016
concerning Affirmation on the
Establishment and Budgeting of
 Provincial, District / City
Extortion Units; and

d. A letter from the Minister of
Home Affairs has been issued.
910/704/A.1/IJ dated July 5,
2017 to the Governor and
Regent/Mayor of the Budgeting
Activities for Clean Sweep Task
Force for Illegal Levies
(SABER PUNGLI)/UPP and
TP4D (Extortion Unit and Team
for the Formation of Guards and
Safeguards for Government and
Regional Development).

2. Development of the Extortion Unit
   a. The Ministry of Home Affairs
      has encouraged the
      establishment of an Extortion
      Unit (UPP) in all Provincial
      Governments;
   b. An analysis and mapping of
      extortion prone areas in local
      governments has been carried
      out, covering the risk areas:
      1) Licensing;
      2) Grants and Social
         Assistance;
      3) Staffing;
      4) Education;
      5) Village Funds;
      6) Public Services; and
      7) Procurement of Goods and
         Services.
   c. An operational plan has been
      prepared for the task of
      sweeping illegal levies in the
      regional government as a
      guideline for the Provincial and
      District or City UPPs in carrying
      out SABER PUNGLI
      operational activities.
   d. It has encouraged local
governments through the Provincial Regional Inspectorate and District or City Inspectorates to support and oversee the implementation of the duties of the Clean Sweep Task Force on the Local Levies in the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 35 of 2018 concerning the 2019 Regional Government Administration Supervision Policy.
e. Hand capture operations have been carried out in 1,431 activities spread across various agencies, with details:

**HAND ARREST OPERATION (OTT) BY THE CLEAN SWEET TASK FORCE FOR ILLEGAL LEVIES**

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<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>Company (Private / National)</td>
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<td>Ngo</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Office Of Cooperatives, Industry And Trade</td>
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<td>National Defense Agency</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Service Of Civil Population And Civilization</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>Inspectorate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Staffing, education and training</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Village Community Empowerment Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Investment Coordinating Board</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Indonesian National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Regional People's Representative Council</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Religious Affairs office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>One roof system</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Marine and Fisheries Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Regional Personnel Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Procurement Service Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Indonesian National Narcotics District Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>BPM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Tax office</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The next achievement is the involvement of the Inspector General of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Clean Sweep Team (SABER PUNGI) in accordance with Presidential Regulation 87 of 2016. Saber's performance combing illegal levies on public services to the lowest level, namely sub-sub-district and villages, is felt effective to make it easier for people to get their rights in fulfilling public services. Not less than 36,343 complaints were received by the SABER PUNGI Team nationally and carried out 5,070 Hand Arrest Operations. The various programs are based on 17 legal products in 2016-2018. This legal product is intended as a guideline and reference for the regional inspectorate and inspectorate in conducting supervision and supervision over the implementation of regional government. The performance of legal products is not seen from how many regulations are produced, but it is seen from how far the regulation is effectively implemented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concern</th>
<th>Info.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>76/2016</td>
<td>2017 Supervision Policy</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>050/781/B.1/IJ</td>
<td>Regional Development Plan and Regional Budget</td>
<td>Circular Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>900/795/B.3/IJ</td>
<td>Guidelines for Implementing Document Review of Medium-Term Regional Development Design and Strategic Plan of Regional Work Unit</td>
<td>Circular Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/2017</td>
<td>Village Fund Supervision Guidelines</td>
<td>Government Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/2017</td>
<td>Guidance and Supervision of the Implementation of Regional Government</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33/2017</td>
<td>Compilation of 2018 Regional Government Work Plans</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation (Mandate No. 31 concerning Monitoring Activity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34/2017</td>
<td>Guidelines for Preparation of Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget for Fiscal Year 2018</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>109/2017</td>
<td>About the Procedures for Implementing Adjustments / Inpassing of Civil</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>110/2017</td>
<td>Environmental Supervision Policy for the Ministry of Home Affairs and National Agency for Border Management in 2018</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4/2018</td>
<td>Policy for Supervising the Implementation of Regional Government in 2018</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10/2018</td>
<td>Review of Regional Medium-Term Development Plans and Regional Equipment Strategic Plans</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/2018</td>
<td>Review of the Annual Development Planning and Regional Budget Documents</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>52/2018</td>
<td>Policy for Supervising the Implementation of Regional Government in 2019</td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs regulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry of Home Affairs as a translation of the functions of providing standards and guidelines, from September 2016-2018 has produced 13 (thirteen) legal products, such as the Village Fund Supervision Guidelines, Accrual Based Financial Report Review Guidelines, Final Term Examination Guidelines.

Organizing activities in a Government Agency, from planning, implementation, supervision, to accountability, must be carried out in an orderly, controlled, and efficient and effective manner. For this reason, we need a system that can provide adequate assurance that the implementation of activities in a Government Agency can achieve its objectives efficiently and effectively, report on managing state finances reliably, securing state assets, and encouraging compliance with laws and regulations. This system is known as the Government Internal Control System (SPIP) which is regulated in Government Regulation Number 60 of 2008, which consists of 5 SPIP Elements including: (1) Control Environment; (2) Risk assessment; (3) Control activities; (4) Information and communication; and (5) Monitoring.

The Inspectorate General of the Ministry of Home Affairs as the SPIP implementation quality assurance has held a kick off on SPIP maturity assessment on 15 August 2017. The series of assessment activities starting with filling in questionnaires by respondents was completed on 8 September 2017 with a participation rate of around 96%.

The results of the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) assessment submitted on June 6, 2018, show the maturity of the Ministry of Home Affairs
Affairs SPIP at level III (Defined), with details:

**SPIPP ASSESSMENT RESULTS**
result of supervision of the implementation of regional government,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element of SPIP</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Assessment Results</th>
<th>Value Change</th>
<th>QA Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Control</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>3,875</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>3,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling Activities</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>3,727</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>3,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the results of the assessment, the next step that must be done is to maintain and strengthen the area of improvement, especially in the element of risk assessment.

In the period of 2016 and 2017, 2,433 total recommendations have been produced as a with a settlement rate of 73.12%. When viewed based on the number of suggestions and recommendations, it can be concluded that there is a decrease in quantity. This indicates that APPIP is no longer oriented towards the number of findings but rather the quality of supervision findings.

The Results of Monitoring Local Government in 2016-201
The performance of monitoring the implementation of regional government in 2018 can be seen based on the table above. Overall, out of 23 regional government supervision activities there were 647 recommendations. Regional financial
aspects are strategic points that are the focus of general supervision with 45% of recommendations. Those phenomena show that the implementation of Supervision and Guidance carried out has a significant impact on the prevention of corruption in the region. However, this also needs to be supported by the Government's political

E. Conclusion

Various facts and issues of corruption from empirical, juridical phenomena, up to the level of terrorism attract the attention of various groups, especially in the Government circle and deserve to be discussed into studies. The study of the issue of Corruption in Indonesia as described earlier, shows various perspectives on the problem of Corruption. Empirical corruption problems are encountered not only from weak government structures, but also those potentials, for example, culture, limited resources, actors in policy implementation, legal strength, synergy between law enforcement agencies, and political support for independent institutions. Specifically to eradicate Corruption. In the context of governance in Indonesia, the challenge of corruption also arises from the will through strategic and synergistic sustainability steps in order to continue developing supervision program of the regions, particularly in the context of corruption in the regions.

consequences of fiscal decentralization that occur at the regional autonomy policy. Power that is spread to autonomous regions along with the potential characteristics possessed by each region tends to enable corruption to occur at the regional level.

However, this phenomenon does not mean that it can be blamed entirely if the government and the high level of community participation to eradicate corruption, allow crime to be minimally minimized. This effort is supported by synergies, for example by implementing Government Regulation Number 71 of 2000 concerning the Code of Ethics for Participating People in Running Government, by giving awards to those who enforce crime. After all, corruption is theoretically interpreted as an act that is not commendable that harms the state. Related to this, a joint and sustainable step is needed to identify existing conditions and
constraints both from internal and external factors of government. Various innovations related to efforts to prevent corruption from local governments are needed, but the most important is the commitment of all officials in the government horizontally and vertically.

F. Suggestion

1. In-depth studies need to be carried out in factors contributing to corruption,

Bibliography


2. The practical advice is that corruption activities are not only carried out in actions and punishments, but need to be done preventively through various socialization and education activities.


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